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Introduction: Contracts and the Pandemic 
The COVID-19 pandemic which has spread rapidly around the globe will be devastating for 
millions of people.  Some will contract the Sars-Cov-2 virus and a vast number will be affected by 
the wide economic consequences the pandemic will bring. A key issue affecting businesses (and 
consumers) is the impact of the pandemic and its consequences on many existing contracts, 
particularly those where performance is to occur over a period of time and/or to commence at 
some point in the future. For contracting parties, the pandemic and its consequences could not 
have been foreseen. A party which cannot perform as agreed will seek to be excused from doing 
so and to escape liability for breach of contract. In the context of many commercial relationships, 
there will be scope for negotiations and agreed adjustments to existing contracts.1 Failing such 
negotiations, there are two common contract law devices which will be pressed into service: (i) 
contractual provision for unforeseen events in the case of force majeure or hardship; and (ii) 
provisions of the applicable domestic contract law dealing with unforeseen or unforeseeable 
events arising after a contract has been concluded. Where neither the contract nor the applicable 
law provides a solution, a failure to perform will trigger whichever remedies are provided by the 
applicable law as well as a duty on the aggrieved party to act to mitigate the extent of its losses.2 
The robustness of the contract laws around the world in providing workable solutions will be 
tested by the pandemic. This could prompt either a recalibration of existing doctrines or the 
development of new rules (whether limited to the consequences of this pandemic3 or as a 
                                               
1 For contract law scholars in the common law world, the implications for the doctrine of consideration, as well as 
promissory estoppel, will be interesting. 
2 Space precludes a discussion in this paper of the particular issues which might arise with regard to remedies for 
non-performance/breach of contract, e.g., in applying the remoteness test for contract damages, or the extent of 
the duty to mitigate. 
3 For example, Germany has already made COVID-19 specific changes to the Introductory Law to the Civil Code which 
permit consumers and small businesses to withhold performance in certain circumstances. These changes are 
currently set to expire at the end of June 2020 (see Art.240, §1 “Moratorium”).   
156 
 
general revision of the law). This paper will provide a brief comparative perspective of relevant 
provisions for commercial contracts, focusing on the international dimension as well as selected 
national rules. 
 
Contractual Risk Allocation: Force Majeure clauses 
Most commercial contracts contain a force majeure clause of some kind to deal with events 
occurring after a contract has been concluded and which are beyond the reasonable control of 
the parties. The effect of such events will affect the ability of either or both parties to a contract 
to perform their obligations as agreed, whether that be by making performance more onerous, 
more costly, or altogether impossible. A force majeure clause will stipulate how the occurrence 
of such an event will affect the contract, e.g., by permitting the parties to suspend performance, 
requiring cost adjustments or the renegotiation of elements of the contract, precluding 
termination for breach where that breach is caused by the event, or even bringing the contract 
to an end.4 The precise effects of invoking a force majeure clause may depend on the duration of 
the event triggering the clause – if it is of limited temporary effect, then contract performance 
might merely be suspended, but if its duration cannot be determined, the contract may be 
terminated. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) issued an updated force majeure 
clause in March 2020 (an update to the 2003 version5) in response to the pandemic6 and 
recommended its use in international commercial contracts.  
 
There is, however, no uniform conception of force majeure. The ICC’s 2020 clause defines a force 
majeure event as “the occurrence of an event or circumstance that prevents or impedes a party 
from performing one or more of its contractual obligations under the contract.”7 The impediment 
must have been (i) beyond the reasonable control of the party seeking to rely on the clause and 
(ii) one that could not reasonably have been foreseen at the time of contract conclusion and (iii) 
                                               
4 See e.g, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) ICC Force Majeure Clause 2003 for a range of consequences 
arising from a force majeure event. 
5 Available at https://iccwbo.org/resources-for-business/model-contracts-clauses/force-majeure/ [accessed 13 
April 2020] 
6 Available at https://iccwbo.org/publication/icc-force-majeure-and-hardship-clauses/ [accessed 13 April 2020] 
7 Paragraph 1 of the ICC Force Majeure Clause 2020. 
157 
 
with effects that could not reasonably have been avoided or overcome by the affected party.8 
The first two aspects are satisfied if one of the specific events listed in paragraph 3 of the clause 
has occurred. Indeed, force majeure clauses frequently spell out in some detail the kinds of 
events that will trigger it, often based on previous occurrences which had a significant impact on 
contract performance.  
 
Relevant events might include political or societal disruption (war, border closures, closure of key 
shipping routes; strikes or rioting), legal disruption (major changes to the legal context for the 
transaction), or natural events (floods, earthquakes). Whether the particular event which has 
occurred triggers a force majeure clause will depend on the wording of that clause, i.e., whether 
the event which impedes performance is listed in the clause.  
 
In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, a force majeure clause which expressly mentions 
pandemics would be applicable and triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, if the 
contract does not mention pandemic specifically,  it may be possible for a party to rely on another 
event mentioned in the clause. The ICC Force Majeure Clause 2003, which will be the relevant 
clause in most international commercial contracts rather than the 2020 version, includes 
“epidemics” among the list of factors deemed to constitute a force majeure event but not a 
“pandemic”. This is also the case in the March 2020 version. However, as a pandemic is an 
epidemic of global proportions, the clause might still be triggered.  Alternatively, other events, 
such as “prolonged break-down of transport”9 might trigger the clause: if the goods supplied 
under the contract rely on air freight and airports are closed because of the pandemic, the clause 
would apply on that basis. Some clauses contain a catch-all rider along the lines of “any other 
event beyond the control of the parties” or similar, which should cover the COVID-19 pandemic.  
 
It will next be essential to establish a causal link between the trigger event and the ability of a 
party to perform the contract as agreed. The fact that an event listed in a force majeure clause 
                                               
8 These aspects resemble the conditions under which a party is exempt from liability for non-performance under 
Art.79 CISG (see below). 
9 Also mentioned in both the 2003 and 2020 versions of the ICC Force Majeure Clause. 
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has occurred will not suffice unless there is an impact on the ability of the parties to perform. It 
will be necessary to show that the reason why a party cannot perform is caused by the trigger 
event, so if the event relied upon in the clause is a “pandemic,” then the reason why the party is 
unable to perform must be related to the pandemic. For example, social distancing rules and 
restrictions to non-essential business activities might make it impossible to perform the contract 
during the period when these restrictions are in place. On the other hand, the fact that the price 
of goods or components required for performance has changed might not be sufficient. 
 
Finally, the party seeking to rely on the force majeure clause would have to demonstrate that 
there are no reasonable alternative steps available to it to avoid the consequences of the trigger 
event, or at least to mitigate its effects. For example, it may be possible to source goods or 
components from a different supplier. 
 
If a force majeure clause can be relied upon successfully, then the precise consequences will 
depend on the outcome the clause provides for. The clause may merely suspend performance 
without either party incurring liability for non-performance, exonerate a party from any liability 
for non-performance, or bring the contract to an end. Both the 2003 and 2020 versions of the 
ICC limit relief from performance and liability for non-performance to the duration of the 
impediment. 
 
Legal rules for cases of unforeseen events after contract formation 
Should a contract not contain a force majeure clause at all, or should the clause be drafted in 
such a way as not to capture the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the parties could seek to rely 
on the legal rules of the law governing the contract which deal with this situation. For example, 
in English Law, the doctrine of frustration applies in some narrow circumstances where an event 
occurs after a contract has been concluded which makes the contract impossible to perform10 
(e.g., due to the loss of the subject-matter of the contract, or commercial impossibility), or would 
                                               
10 Taylor v Caldwell (1863) 3 B & S 826. 
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make performance “radically different”11 from what was agreed in the contract. Mere financial 
hardship for one of the parties would not suffice. The event in question must have been 
unforeseen, or even unforeseeable,12 by the parties, and neither party must have directly or 
indirectly brought about the event relied on. Where the doctrine operates, the effect is that the 
contract is terminated as a matter of law. The threshold for engaging the doctrine of frustration 
is high,13 and it will not assist if one of the parties has assumed the risk of the event occurring, or 
its consequences,14 under the contract. 
 
In contrast, Art.313 of the German Civil Code (BGB)15 deals with the consequences of a significant 
change in the circumstances forming the basis of the contract (“Störung der 
Geschäftsgrundlage”). If the parties would not have entered into the contract at all or only on 
different terms, had they foreseen this change, then modification of the contract can be 
demanded. This is subject to the requirement that, taking account of all the circumstances of the 
particular case including the contractual risk-allocation, upholding the contract would not be 
acceptable to one of the parties.16 If it is not possible to modify the contract, or if the modification 
cannot reasonably be expected to be imposed on the party affected, then that party may 
withdraw from the contract or, in the case of a long-term contract, terminate by giving notice.17 
In French Law, Art.1218 of the French Civil Code contains a statutory provision for force majeure 
for events beyond the control of the parties which were unforeseeable at the time of contract 
formation and which make performance impossible. If performance would still be possible but 
unduly onerous on one party, then that party could plead hardship under Art.1195 of the French 
                                               
11 E.g., Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham UDC [1956] AC 696 and The Sea Angel [2007] EWCA Civ 547. 
12 Walton Harvey Ltd v Walker and Homfrays [1931] 1 Ch 274; Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd v John 
Walker & Sons Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 164. 
13 The Sea Angel [2007] EWCA Civ 547. 
14 See Canary Wharf v European Medicines Agency [2019] EWHC 335, a case arising out of the UK’s withdrawal from 
the EU. The European Medicines Agency, which was headquartered in London, moved to Amsterdam and sought to 
escape a 25-year lease on its premises. The judge concluded that, whilst withdrawal from the EU was not foreseeable 
in 2011, when the lease was entered into, the parties has foreseen the possibility that the EMA might vacate its 
premise early and provided for this in the lease. Consequently, the lease had not been frustrated. 
15 An English translation is available at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.htm [ 
accessed 13 April 2020]. 
16 Art.313(1) BGB. 
17 See Art.313(3) BGB, 
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Civil Code. Where force majeure is invoked, contract performance is either suspended if the event 
is temporary or the contract is terminated. In a hardship situation, the affected party can request 
renegotiation of the contract.  Where this is rejected by the other party or unsuccessful, the 
parties can agree to request judicial assistance or terminate the contract. 
 
In the context of international commercial law, Article 79 of the United Nations Convention on 
the International Sale of Goods (CISG)18 exempts a party from liability for non-performance 
where “the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and … he could not reasonably 
be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract or to have avoided or overcome it, or its consequences.”19 This exemption lasts for the 
duration of the impediment only.20 The effect of Art.79 CISG is that there is no liability for 
damages but the other party can exercise any of the other rights in respect of non-performance.21 
Consequently, if the impediment is such that the non-performance amounts to a fundamental 
breach,22 the contract may be avoided.23  
 
By way of comparison, according to Art.7.1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (UPICC), a party’s non-performance is excused if this was “due to an 
impediment beyond its control”.24 This is subject to the proviso that the non-performing party 
“could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at time of the 
conclusion of the contract”25 or have mitigated the impediment or its consequences. 
Furthermore, Art. 6.2.2 UPICC deals with hardship, which occurs “where the occurrence of events 
fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the contract,” either because the cost of performing has 
increased or the value of the performance provided has been reduced. The event in question (i) 
                                               
18 Applicable to international commercial contracts for the sale of goods; ratified by 93 states. 
19 Art.79(1) CISG. Compare the definition of “force majeure” in the ICC’s Force Majeure Clause 2020, paragraph1 
(see above). 
20 Art.79(3) CISG. 
21 Art.79(5) CISG. 
22 As defined in Art.25 CISG. 
23 Arts.49 and 64 CISG. 
24 Art. 7.1.7(1) UPICC. 
25 Ibid. Presumably, this includes making appropriate provision for this in the contract, suggesting that the 
impediment was not foreseen or reasonably foreseeable. 
161 
 
must have occurred or become known after the contract was concluded; (ii) could not reasonably 
have been taken into account before the contract was concluded; (iii) is beyond the control of 
the party suffering hardship; and (iv) must be one in respect of which the party suffering hardship 
did not assume the risk.26 
 
The examples from these legal regimes show that there are several common features, although 
there are differences in the detail, and their application will, of course, vary in light of relevant 
case-law. However, for present purposes, a number of broadly comparable common features can 
be noted. First, the event or impediment must have arisen after the contract had been concluded. 
Second, the event must at least have been unforeseen at the time of conclusion or even not 
reasonably foreseeable. There is some variation in what precisely is required in this regard – to 
say that the event/impediment was not foreseen sets the bar lower than to say that the 
event/impediment was not reasonably foreseeable – something can be foreseeable without 
having been foreseen. Third, there must be no provision in the contract in respect of the 
event/impediment or its consequences, i.e., no force majeure and/or hardship clause, nor 
specific contractual risk allocation of the consequences of the event/impediment. If the contract 
does make such provision, then the parties can no longer rely on whatever background provisions 
for unforeseen events there might be under the governing law. 
 
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, these three aspects raise particular issues. The 
pandemic was declared by the World Health Organisation on 11 March 2020, although the effects 
of the spread of the Sars-Cov-2 virus could be felt long before then. In respect of many contracts 
concluded from mid-to-late February onwards, it may be difficult to argue that the 
event/impediment only occurred after such contracts were concluded. That said, it may be 
arguable that the stringent social distancing measures and increasing restrictions of commercial 
activities could be treated as separate events/impediments which could not be relied on in 
respect of any contracts concluded after such measures had been announced but might be 
                                               
26 Similar provisions can also be found in the Principles of European Contract Law, Art. 6:111 (change of 
circumstances) and Art.8:108 (excuse due to an impediment). 
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relevant impediments in respect of contracts concluded earlier. However, the rapid pace of 
developments from the emergence of the virus to a full-blown pandemic would make such 
distinctions of limited relevance in practice.  
 
Secondly, the question of whether the pandemic and its consequences were foreseen, or 
reasonably foreseeable, will matter. Indeed, clarity about whether the requirement is that it was 
foreseen or reasonably foreseeable will be crucial: a party seeking to rely on frustration, force 
majeure, or hardship will be able to do so more readily if it can show that the event/impediment 
was not foreseen even if it was reasonably foreseeable. Of course, if an event/impediment was 
reasonably foreseeable, arguing successfully that it was not foreseen would mean having to 
overcome a high evidentiary threshold. The fact that something was reasonably foreseeable will 
effectively raise a rebuttable presumption that it was foreseen. But clarity on what the relevant 
standard is will be important. 
 
Furthermore, it will be essential to determine what precisely must have been reasonably 
foreseeable: would it suffice that there was a possibility that there might be a pandemic which 
could be seriously disruptive or would it be necessary that a pandemic caused by a novel type of 
coronavirus spreading rapidly around the globe was reasonably foreseeable? In respect of any 
contracts concluded before December 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic was certainly not foreseen, 
nor was it reasonably foreseeable that there would be a COVID-19 pandemic let alone its severe 
and immediate impact on ordinary activities. However, it is less obvious that the possibility of a 
pandemic was not foreseeable. Only 11 years ago, the Swine Flu (H1N1 influenza) pandemic 
affected many countries around the world. In the intervening years, there were outbreaks of 
SARS and MERS which were contained. In that sense, the possibility that a pandemic, whether 
from an influenza virus or coronavirus, might occur at some point was not unforeseeable. 
However, the question would have to be whether any kind of pandemic during the contract 
period was not only foreseeable but whether it was reasonably foreseeable by the parties. The 
point here is that the question of whether the event/impediment was foreseeable may depend 
on the degree of precision that is required to identify the event/impediment. A low standard of 
163 
 
precision would mean that the law would rarely be of assistance whereas too high a degree of 
precision might, in contrast, make it too easy to invoke frustration or hardship. So while a 
relatively high degree of precision would be justified, it should not be too high.27 Consequently, 
the question should be whether the rapid development of a pandemic which would necessitate 
measures causing serious disruption was reasonably foreseeable. The answer to this is almost 
certainly going to be that it was not. 
 
This leaves the third question,  whether the risk of serious disruption as a result of the pandemic 
were assumed by either party under the terms of the contract. What matters here is whether 
there was an assumption of risk regarding the consequences of the pandemic, e.g., with regard 
to the possibility to continue normal business operations, suspension of activities etc. If the 
contract makes provision for this, then the contractual risk allocation will govern the situation 
and frustration/hardship no longer apply. 
 
In short, for many contracts concluded before December 2019, there is a reasonable prospect 
that rules on frustration, hardship, or something similar will be of assistance. The difficulty may 
lie in respect of the legal consequences arising from the application of these rules. The 
consequence of frustration in English law is that the contract is terminated by operation of law 
and the rather complex adjustments under the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 might 
come into play for financial adjustments. There is no scope for suspending performance, liability 
for breach, or to provide an opportunity for renegotiation. Under Art.79 (5) CISG, a party unable 
to perform is exempt from liability in damages for breach of contract. In contrast, under Art. 6.2.3 
UPICC, in the case of hardship, renegotiation would be the first step, and if that failed, a court 
could either bring the contract to an end on terms or amend the contract “with a view to restoring 
its equilibrium”.28 If the situation falls under the force majeure provision of Art. 7.1.7 UPICC, non-
performance is excused, although the other party may terminate the contract for a fundamental 
                                               
27 Note Marcus Smith J’s observations that “There will, no doubt, be many cases where something can be foreseen 
as a theoretical possibility, but where neither party can be criticised for failing to take it into account. The court must 
also beware of framing questions of foreseeability too closely to the exact, specific, nature of the supervening event 
that ultimately occurred.” (Canary Wharf v European Medicines Agency [2019] EWHC 335, paras [211]-[212]. 
28 Art. 6.2.3(4)(b) UPICC. 
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non-performance. Whether immediate termination is preferable to renegotiation or contract 
variation by court order will depend on the circumstances of each contract and its wider 
economic context. 
 
Is a different approach needed for the COVID-19 pandemic? 
In responding to novel circumstances, the instinctive reaction of lawyers is to delve into their 
legal toolbox to see which tools they can use to solve the legal problems which have arisen. 
However, for some problems, the tools they have may not be sufficient and new tools may have 
to be created. The brief discussion above reveals that when contracts are considered individually, 
reliance on appropriately drafted force majeure clauses and the background rules of the 
applicable law for post-formation unforeseen events will cover many contracts affected by the 
impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and might also provide an appropriate solution for many of 
those contracts. However, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is such that the number of 
contracts affected will be enormous. Moreover, it is not just a selected category of contracts 
which is affected but a wide-range of contracts across the economy. This will include many 
contracts which are part of contractual networks or supply chains. With so much commercial 
activity slowing down or grinding to a halt altogether, this will be an instance where lawyers and 
law-makers will have to be creative and think beyond the current law to develop new legal 
solutions. Such solutions could be limited in scope to the current COVID-19 epidemic, but they 
could also be of a more general nature, i.e., the pandemic could be the impetus to strengthen 
contract law now in case of any future severe-impact global disruption. The COVID-19 pandemic 
might feel unique to us but chances are this will not be the last global disruption on this scale. 
 
An immediate solution that might be appropriate in many instances would be to enable the 
suspension of obligations under a contract for a period of time without penalty/liability. In other 
words, performance could effectively be frozen until it becomes possible to relax restrictions and 
allow commercial activity to resume again. One example of a specific COVID-19 response along 
these lines are the temporary changes made to German law permitting consumers and small 
enterprises to withhold performance on defined economic grounds until 30 June 2020 in respect 
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of contracts entered into before 8 March 2020.29 This right to withhold performance is only 
available if the other contracting party’s economic situation would not be unduly affected as a 
result.30 Any related litigation would provide some indication of how this kind of approach would 
work practically. It is, however, a fairly cautious approach, and, for now, limited to a brief period 
– although on current projections, a longer period might be needed. 
 
Conclusion 
The key message of this note is that there are Contract Law mechanisms available to deal with 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on many contracts. Whether these solutions are suitable 
in light of the economic context resulting from the measures taken by governments around the 
world to stem the spread of the virus remains to be seen. The crisis may provide the impetus for 
a review of how contract law regimes deal with the impact of major unforeseeable events on 
existing contracts. Short-term responses will be most appropriate for now, but they would not 
obviate the need for a more thorough look at this issue with a view to reviewing national rules 
on unforeseen post-formation circumstances. 
 
  
                                               
29 Introductory Law to the Civil Code, Art.240, §1(1) and (2). For a brief analysis (in German), see M. Schmidt-Kessel 
and C. Möllnitz, “Coronavertragsrecht – Sonderregeln für Verbraucher und Kleinstunternehmen” (2020) NJW 1103. 
30 Introductory Law to the Civil Code, Art.240, §1(3). 
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